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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine there is a river, and a half mile to the river’s east is a
twenty-acre wetland. To the east of the wetland is a neighborhood. The
river’s eastern bank is seven feet above the mean water line, and the
western bank is ten feet above the mean water line. If the river floods to
eight feet above the mean water line, it will spill over the eastern bank.
The water will flow unfettered for half a mile. However, upon reaching
the wetland, much of the flooding water could be absorbed. One acre of
* Editor’s Note: This Note won the Gertrude Brick Prize for the best Note of the 2009–
10 academic year.
** J.D. expected May 2011, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to
thank Laura and Anna Marie for their love and support. I would also like to thank Professor
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, whose advice and feedback helped make this Note possible.
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wetland flooded to one foot can hold up to 330,000 gallons of water.1
Therefore, the twenty acres in our hypothetical could absorb up to
6,600,000 gallons of water. This could stop the flooding water, or at
least hinder its progress. However, if the wetland were filled in and
replaced with a shopping center, this flood control function would be
unavailable. The impervious cover of the shopping buildings and
accompanying parking lots would prevent the surface absorption of any
water, possibly exacerbating flood damage farther down the water’s
path.2 Therefore, the wetland’s mitigating effect on flood damage would
be trumped by the shopping center’s exacerbating effect. If the wetland
were not under Clean Water Act3 (CWA) jurisdiction, the shopping
center developer could proceed without Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) oversight,
possibly imposing flood damage externalities on the adjacent
neighborhood.
If a CWA § 404 permit were required,4 the Corps could assure that
the developer avoids, minimizes, and mitigates any harm posed to the
wetland and, consequently, to the town.5 However, requiring the wouldbe-developer to acquire CWA permits would impose a significant
financial burden.6 Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence shows a
reluctance to impose such permits unless the CWA’s statutory language
makes abundantly clear that doing so comports with its framers’ intent.7
Discontented with these judicial decisions, House and Senate
Democrats have drafted legislation reasserting federal control over
waters cut out by the Court, and arguably beyond.8 The Clean Water
1. JON KUSLER & TERESA OPHEIM, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND HERITAGE: A PROTECTION
GUIDE 5 (2d ed. 1996).
2. For information on impervious cover, the “land cover that water cannot penetrate,” see
Craig Anthony Arnold, Clean-Water Land Use: Connecting Scale and Function, 23 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 291, 294–301 (2006).
3. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
4. Id. § 1344 (requiring Corps’ authorization to add dredged or fill material into
jurisdictional waters).
5. The Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Transportation and Infrastructure, 110th Cong. 471 (2008) [hereinafter CWRA of 2007 House
Hearings] (statement of The Hon. John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army).
6. See David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation
by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 59, 74–75 (2002).
7. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“We
ordinarily expect a ‘clear and manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented
intrusion into traditional state authority.”); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC] (“Where an
administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect
a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”).
8. See The Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 787, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter
CWRA].
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Restoration Act of 2009 (CWRA), which cleared the Senate
Environmental and Public Works Committee in June of 2009,9 is the
latest of these proposals.10 Under the current form of the CWRA, it is
uncertain how many additional landowners, if any, would be pulled into
Corps and EPA permitting authority.11 This uncertainty is cause for
concern.
Congress passed the Clean Water Act to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”12
The Act exerted federal control over the nation’s “navigable waters,”13
defined ambiguously as “the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas.”14 Congress granted the EPA ultimate discretion to
interpret which waters were jurisdictional.15 Between 1985 and 2006, a
triad of Supreme Court decisions weighed in on the interpretations, with
[T]his Act will treat, as “waters of the United States”, those features that were
treated as such pursuant to the regulations of the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Corps of Engineers in existence before the dates of [the
Rapanos and SWANCC decisions], including—(A) all waters which are subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide; (B) all interstate waters, including interstate
wetlands; (C) all other waters, such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds; (D) all impoundments of
waters of the United States; (E) tributaries of the aforementioned waters; (F)
the territorial seas; and (G) wetlands adjacent to the aforementioned waters[.]
Id. § 3(8).
9. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Env’t. & Pub. Works, EPW Comm. Approves
Clean Water Restoration Act (June 19, 2009), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.c
fm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=F95AB046-802A-23AD-46DC40C4F53FB380.
10. Earlier proposals, all similar in intended effect, are the Clean Water Restoration Act of
2007, S. 1870, 110th Cong. (2007), the Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 2421, 110th
Cong. (2007), the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2005, S. 912, 109th Cong. (2005),
the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003, S. 473, 108th Cong. (2003), and the Clean
Water Authority Restoration Act of 2002, S. 2780, 107th Cong. (2002).
11. See Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 787, Clean Water Restoration
Act, at 2 (2009) [hereinafter CWRA CBO Cost Estimate].
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
13. Id. § 1344(a).
14. Id. § 1362(7).
15. Donna M. Downing et al., Navigating Through Clean Water Act Jurisdiction: A Legal
Review, 23 WETLANDS 475, 483 (2003).
In 1979, the Secretary of the Army requested the Attorney General of the
United States to clarify whether the Corps or EPA had the ultimate
administrative authority to determine the reach of the term “navigable waters”
for purposes of CWA section 404. In his opinion letter, Attorney General
[Benjamin] Civiletti determined that “‘navigable waters’ can have only one
interpretation under the Act,” and EPA is charged with administering the entire
Clean Water Act.
Id.
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the latter two decisions significantly narrowing which waters should be
included.16 Depending on whether a reader looks to the plurality opinion
or to the concurrence, the Supreme Court’s latest word on the issue,
Rapanos v. United States,17 limits federal jurisdiction to either 1)
“relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of
water”18 and “wetlands with a continuous surface connection” to those
waters19 or 2) those waters possessing a “significant nexus” to navigable
waters.20
The main thrust of the CWRA is to remove the word “navigable”
from the definition of waters reached by the CWA.21 Neither the 2009
version of the CWRA nor its House and Senate predecessors have been
warmly received by the regulated community.22 Whereas environmental
groups have extolled the Act’s benefits and largely ignored the potential
costs,23 private property advocates have focused solely on the burdens
the Act will impose while ignoring the potential benefits.24 Opponents
argue that the Act extends beyond Congress’ commerce powers.25 They
argue that the Act pushes jurisdiction beyond areas of national concern
16. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (plurality opinion); SWANCC,
531 U.S. 159, 170–74 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
131–39 (1985).
17. 547 U.S. 715.
18. Id. at 739 (plurality opinion).
19. Id. at 742.
20. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
21. CWRA, supra note 8, § 5(1).
22. See generally, e.g., The Future of Specialty Crops for Small Family Farmers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Rural Development, Entrepreneurship and Trade of the H. Comm. on
Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Bill Holbrook, Owner, Cold Mountain
Farms); Meeting the Needs of Small Businesses and Family Farmers in Regulating Our Nation’s
Waters: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of
James K. Chilton, Jr., on behalf of Arizona Cattle Growers Association, Public Lands Council,
and National Cattlemen’s Beef Association); Meeting the Needs of Small Businesses and Family
Farmers in Regulating Our Nation’s Waters: Hearing Before the H.Comm. on Small Business,
111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Bob Gray, Executive Director, Northeast Dairy Farm
Cooperatives); Meeting the Needs of Small Businesses and Family Farmers in Regulating our
Nation’s Waters: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Trey Pebley, Vice President, McAllen Construction, Inc.); Meeting the Needs of
Small Businesses and Family Farmers in Regulating Our Nation’s Waters: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Lyle Schellenberg,
President, Armadillo Underground, Inc. and National Utility Contractors Association); CWRA of
2007 House Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of The Hon. John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant
Secretary of the Army).
23. See,
e.g.,
Sierra
Club,
Restoring
the
Clean
Water
Act,
http://illinois.sierraclub.org/legislation/2009/docs/federal/CWRAFactSheet7.09.pdf (last visited
May 15, 2010).
24. See supra note 22.
25. See
Is
the
Clean
Water
Restoration
Act
Constitutional?,
http://rapanos.typepad.com/my_weblog/2009/06/plf-calls-clean-water-restoration-act-clearly-un
con stitutional.html (June 1, 2009).
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and “eliminate[s] the current separation between the state and federal
government, bringing the federal government into local land use
decisions.”26 This arguably leaves property owners subject to a more
distant and less responsive authority than that found in state
governments. Additionally, opponents argue the financial burdens
imposed by extending federal jurisdiction will unduly restrict property
owners’ rights to utilize their land.27
This Note addresses the concerns with the Clean Water Restoration
Act. Following the Introduction, Part II briefly outlines what constitutes
a wetland and why protection is important. Part III summarizes the
history of the CWA’s § 404 permitting scheme and reviews the three
pivotal Supreme Court decisions. Following the review is a description
of the resulting CWRA legislation. Part IV addresses the
constitutionality of the CWRA, in particular whether it exceeds
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause28 and whether it
improperly impinges on state sovereignty. A look at modern Commerce
Clause jurisprudence demonstrates that Congress is indeed empowered
to pass the CWRA.29 Many CWRA waters are “things in interstate
commerce,” and all included waters “substantially affect interstate
commerce.”30 Further, regardless of arguments that the waters’ effects
on interstate commerce may be too attenuated to fall within Congress’
commerce powers, the regulated activities themselves affect interstate
commerce. The language of the CWRA is structured to extend
jurisdiction both to waters affecting commerce and to waters where
“activities affecting these waters[] are subject to the legislative power of
Congress under the Constitution.”31
Should the Supreme Court have the opportunity to review the
CWRA, the Act should not be invalidated. Passage of the CWRA would
be constitutional. However, substantial public policy arguments cut
against the Act in its present form. The Act’s implementation would
affect interstate commerce, and the effect could be detrimental both to
local governments and to the private sector. Economic implications are
unknown but may well be substantial.32 Other than retaining the
exemptions to § 404 included in the CWA,33 the CWRA does not
26. The Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing Before the S. Environment and
Public Works Comm., 110th Cong. 6 (2008) (statement of David Brand, County Sanitary
Engineer, Madison County, Ohio).
27. See Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1870 Before the S. Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 110th Cong. 9 (2008) (testimony of Randall Smith, on behalf of
the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29. See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159
(2001); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
30. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
31. CWRA, supra note 8, § 4(25).
32. CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 11, at 2.
33. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(13)(A) (“[N]othing in this Act modifies or otherwise affects
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address potential economic harm caused by increased permitting
jurisdiction. Land developers, farmers, and ranchers have all attested
that they will be harmed by the CWRA,34 yet have provided no data to
support this claim. Part V of this Note addresses the uncertainty of the
CWRA’s economic impacts. Until more substantiated economic data is
developed and considered, passage of the CWRA is unwise. The Act
clarifies the constitutional scope of federal jurisdiction but has an
imprudent “wait and see” approach to economic costs.
This Note concludes that more research must be done before CWRA
passage would be appropriate. Supporters are not considering economic
costs, and opponents are not considering environmental costs.35
Bringing federal jurisdiction back to pre-2001 levels would have
predictable economic impacts; the impacts would be comparable to
those actually demonstrated prior to the Supreme Court’s 2001
curtailment of jurisdiction.36 However, the CWRA arguably expands
jurisdiction beyond pre-2001 levels. A responsible Congress would
attempt to better ascertain additional costs before taking this step.
II. WETLANDS
Wetlands are “those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface
or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and
that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.”37 The Corps
evaluates the presence of three factors when judging whether an area
constitutes a wetland: hydrophytic plants, hydric soil, and wetland
hydrology.38 As detailed in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Rapanos
concurrence, the Corps looks to:
(1) [The] prevalence of plant species typically adapted to
saturated soil conditions . . . ; (2) hydric soil, meaning soil
that is saturated, flooded, or ponded for sufficient time
during the growing season to become anaerobic . . . ; and
(3) wetland hydrology, a term generally requiring
continuous inundation or saturation to the surface during at

[CWA and prior CWA amendments] that exempted certain activities, such as farming,
silviculture, and ranching activities, as well as agricultural stormwater discharges and return
flows from oil, gas, and mining operations and irrigated agriculture, from particular permitting
requirements.”).
34. See sources cited supra notes 22 and 27.
35. See sources cited supra notes 22–23 and 25–27.
36. See Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 6, at 74–75.
37. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2005), quoted in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 761
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
38. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 761 (citing U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, WETLANDS RESEARCH
PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT Y-87-1 (online edition) 12–34 (1987), http://el.erdc.usace.army.m
il/elpubs/pdf/wlman87.pdf (last visited May 15, 2010)).
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least five percent of the growing season in most years.39
There are four general categories of wetlands found in the United
States: marshes, swamps, bogs, and fens.40 Marshes are tidal (coastal) or
nontidal (inland) wetlands containing herbaceous vegetation dependent
on saturated soil conditions.41 Examples include freshwater marshes,
wet meadows, wet prairies, prairie potholes, playas, and vernal pools.42
Whereas marshes are dominated by herbaceous vegetation, swamps are
characterized by trees and shrubs.43 Swamps, which occur both in
freshwater and saltwater conditions, are further characterized as forested
swamps, shrub swamps, and mangrove swamps.44 Bogs are
“characterized by spongy peat deposits, a growth of evergreen trees and
shrubs, and a floor covered by a thick carpet of sphagnum moss.”45
Examples include northern bogs and pocosins.46 Fens are also
characterized by peat deposits, but they differ from bogs in that they are
richer in nutrients and less acidic.47
Wetlands serve valuable ecological functions and are integral to a
healthy ecosystem.48 They prevent damage to neighboring lands by
providing conveyance and storage of flood waters.49 Coastal wetlands
are barriers to waves,50 serving as “‘horizontal levees’ that . . . absorb
storm surges.”51 Both inland and along the coast, wetlands serve to
prevent erosion and help with sediment control.52 Another benefit is
pollution control: “Wetlands act as settling ponds and remove excess
nutrients and other pollutants by filtering and causing chemical
breakdown of pollutants.”53 Wetlands also serve as habitats for fish and
39. Id. Anaerobic soil is the cause of the repugnant smell often associated with wetlands.
Bacteria which thrive in the oxygen-free soil emanate the rotten-egg odor of hydrogen-sulfide.
See THEDA BRADDOCK, WETLANDS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGY, THE LAW, AND PERMITTING
5 (2d ed. 2007).
40. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TYPES OF WETLANDS (2001) http://www.epa.gov/owow/w
etlands/pdf/types.pdf 1–2 (last visited May 7, 2010).
41. Id. at 1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id..
46. Id.
47. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Wetlands: Fens, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/types/
fen.html (last visited May 7, 2010).
48. KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 1, at 5–10.
49. Id. at 5. As noted in the Introduction, one acre of wetland flooded to one foot can hold
up to 330,000 gallons of water—water that would flood neighboring parcels if the wetland were
not present. Id.
50. Id.
51. Sandra Zellmer, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina
World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 610 (2007) (citing Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 35 (2006)).
52. KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 1, at 5.
53. Id. at 7.
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wildlife, provide water based recreation, and contribute to surface water
supply and aquifer recharge.54
When the first European settlers began to emigrate to what is now
the United States, they came to a land containing approximately 393
million acres of wetlands.55 From the colonial days through the mid20th Century, wetlands were considered foul, malarial areas that
prevented land from being properly utilized for crop cultivation or
development.56 Prompted by governmental acquiescence and even
actual encouragement of wetland destruction,57 by 1954, half of the
United States’ wetlands had been destroyed by drainage, fill, and
construction.58 In the decades leading up to the CWA’s 1972 passage,
the rate of wetland destruction in the United States was approximately
460,000 acres per year.59 Following the passage of the CWA and later
aided by the “no net loss” policy promulgated during the first President
Bush’s administration,60 a reverse in the trend has led to a net increase
of 32,000 acres of wetlands from 1988 to 2004.61 However, this trend is
jeopardized by the Supreme Court’s recent § 404 jurisprudence.
III. THE CLEAN WATER ACT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE CLEAN
WATER RESTORATION ACT OF 2009: A BRIEF HISTORY
A. The Clean Water Act and § 404 Permitting
To “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters,” the 92nd Congress passed the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, popularly known as
the Clean Water Act.62 The CWA regulates the addition of pollutants to
jurisdictional waters.63 Section 404 concerns the permitting
requirements for adding dredged or fill material into such waters64 and
is applicable to wetlands because fill material is considered a pollutant
pursuant to § 502.65 In continuance of its role in dredge and fill
54. Id. at 6–7.
55. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 6. Of these 393 acres, approximately 220 million were
in the lower, coterminous forty-eight states. Id.
56. Id.
57. In the mid-19th Century, Congress passed the Swamp Lands Act, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519
(1850) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 981–94 (2006)), granting to states the right to “reclaim”
wetlands to reduce flooding destruction and mosquito havens. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 6.
58. KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 1, at 3.
59. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 471.
60. Id. at 470.
61. Id. at 471.
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
63. Id. § 1362(6) (“The term ‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and
industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.”).
64. Id. § 1344.
65. Id. § 1362(6).
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permitting under a CWA precursor, the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899,66 the Army Corps of Engineers exercises
CWA authority to issue § 404 permits.67 The EPA, however, reserves an
oversight and advisory function and may overrule a Corps decision
granting a permit.68 During the early years of the CWA, the Corps and
the EPA disagreed regarding the scope of § 404 jurisdiction.69 Whereas
the Corps maintained jurisdiction should be limited to discharges
intended either to change an aquatic area into a non-aquatic area or to
raise the elevation of an aquatic bed, the EPA held that all solid waste
discharges should be included, regardless of the intent or effect of the
discharge.70 In 1986, the two agencies entered into an agreement on the
matter, in which a discharge of fill material would be considered
jurisdictional if:
(a) The discharge has as its primary purpose or has as one
principle purpose of multi-purposes to replace a
portion of the waters of the United States with dry
land or to raise the bottom elevation[,]
(b) The discharge results from activities such as road
construction or other activities where the material to
be discharged is generally identified with
construction-type activities[,]
(c) A principal effect of the discharge is physical loss or
physical modification of waters of the United States,
including smothering of aquatic life or habitat[, or]
(d) The discharge is heterogeneous in nature and of the
type normally associated with sanitary landfill
discharges.71
The Corps’ early understanding of the CWA confined its authority to
the waters covered by the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899: “[N]avigable waters, including waters subject to the ebb and flow
of the tides, waters which are or have been used to transport interstate
commerce, tidal flats under navigable waters, and the natural
meandering of rivers.”72 However, as a result of a citizen suit in Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,73 the Corps expanded its
66. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401–18 (2006). For information on the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, see Zellmer, supra note 51, at 612.
67. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 44.
68. Id. at 44 n.10 (citing Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the
Army and the Environmental Protection Agency Concerning Determination of the Geographic
Jurisdiction of the Section 404 Program and the Application of Exceptions Under Section 404(f)
of the Clean Water Act (Jan. 19, 1989)).
69. Id. at 45.
70. Id.
71. Memorandum of Agreement on Solid Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (Mar. 14, 1986).
72. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 44 n.12.
73. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
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interpretation of jurisdictional waters to include wetlands.74
Consequently, regulations promulgated after Callaway explicitly
reference wetlands.75 This jurisdictional expansion withstood Supreme
Court review in one decision,76 only to be dramatically curtailed in later
decisions.77
B. The Supreme Court and § 404 Permitting
1. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,78 the Supreme
Court addressed whether the CWA “authorizes the Corps to
require . . . permits . . . before discharging fill material into wetlands
adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries.”79 The Court
noted that the Corps’ interpretation of CWA jurisdiction should be
afforded deference so long as it was not unreasonable and did not
contravene congressional intent.80 The Court also acknowledged that
“[i]n determining the limits of its power to regulate [wetland]
discharges under the Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some point
at which water ends and land begins.”81 Looking to the CWA’s
legislative history and its underlying ecological policies, the Court
found the Corps’ asserted jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters not unreasonable, and therefore legitimate.82 Further,
adjacent wetlands were covered by the CWA even when the wetlands
were not flooded by or permeated by the adjacent waters.83 Wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters “may function as integral parts of the
aquatic environment even when the moisture creating the wetlands does
not find its source in the adjacent bodies of water.”84 The Court noted
that though the CWA did not explicitly mention wetlands, “a refusal by
Congress to overrule an agency’s construction of legislation is at least
some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly
[as here,] where the administrative construction has been brought to
Congress’ attention.”85

74. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 44 n.12.
75. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2) (2009).
76. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
77. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (plurality opinion); SWANCC,
531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
78. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
79. Id. at 123.
80. Id. at 131.
81. Id. at 132.
82. Id. at 132–35.
83. Id. at 134–35.
84. Id. at 135.
85. Id. at 137.
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2. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers
In 2001, the Supreme Court revisited the scope of § 404 jurisdiction
in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANCC).86 In SWANCC, the Corps tried to exert
jurisdiction over an abandoned sand and gravel pit containing isolated,
non-navigable, intrastate, “permanent and seasonal ponds.”87 The Corps
premised its jurisdiction on the fact that several species of migratory
birds frequented the isolated waters.88 Pursuant to the Corps’ Migratory
Bird Rule, this served as the requisite link to interstate commerce, thus
validating CWA jurisdiction.89 Not persuaded, the Court struck down
the Migratory Bird Rule as not within the scope of CWA authority.90
After SWANCC, the Corps could still exert jurisdiction over navigable
waters, tributaries to navigable waters, wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters, and wetlands adjacent to the tributaries of navigable waters.91
However, the Corps lost the authority to regulate isolated, nonnavigable, intrastate waters.
3. Rapanos v. United States
The Supreme Court’s most recent word on the scope of the Corps’
§ 404 permitting authority came in 2006 with Rapanos v. United
States.92 The Court in Rapanos could not garner the requisite five votes
for a majority opinion but rather produced a four-member plurality
penned by Justice Antonin Scalia93 and a concurrence penned by Justice
Kennedy.94 The opinions proved complex and confusing, and produced
uncertainty on what the post-Rapanos standard for § 404 jurisdiction
precisely is.95 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion cabined jurisdiction to
“relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of
water”96 and “wetlands with a continuous surface connection” to those
waters.97 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, on the other hand, found all
waters possessing a “significant nexus” to navigable waters to be
86. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
87. Id. at 162–63.
88. Id. at 164–65.
89. Id. at 173. The Corps also justified the Migratory Bird Rule because it protected the
“habitat [of] birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties.” Id. at 164.
90. Id. at 174.
91. For a summary of Corps jurisdiction following SWANCC, see BRADDOCK, supra note
39, at 39–40.
92. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
93. Id. at 719–57 (plurality opinion).
94. Id. at 759–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95. For information on case law following the Rapanos decision, see U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Post-Rapanos Caselaw, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/Post-RapanosCaselaw
6407.pdf (last visited May 16, 2010).
96. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion).
97. Id. at 742.
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jurisdictional waters.98 He understood this nexus to be determinable
only on a case-by-case basis.99 Writing for the dissent, Justice John Paul
Stevens noted that since the four dissenting Justices would uphold
jurisdiction in all waters included in either Justice Scalia’s or Justice
Kennedy’s test, satisfaction of either test should validate jurisdiction.100
Interpreting this decision has proven less than workable, leading to
disparate standards and frustration among the courts, the Corps, and the
regulated community.101
C. The Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009
The Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009 amends the CWA “by
striking ‘navigable waters of the United States’ each place it appears
and inserting ‘waters of the United States.’”102 Importantly, the CWRA
expressly exerts federal jurisdiction over all intrastate waters, language
not found in the 1972 CWA.103 Under the CWRA, jurisdictional waters
would include
[A]ll waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, the
territorial seas, and all interstate and intrastate waters and
their tributaries, including lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes,
natural ponds, and all impoundments of the foregoing, to
the fullest extent that these waters, or activities affecting
these waters, are subject to 104
the legislative power of
Congress under the Constitution.
Whereas the original CWA ambiguously asserted jurisdiction over
“navigable waters,” defined only as “the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas,”105 the CWRA language is explicit and
closely follows the pre-Rapanos Army Corps of Engineers delineation
of covered waters found in 33 C.F.R. § 383.3.106
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 779–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 782.
Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 95.
CWRA, supra note 8, § 5(1).
Id. § 4(25).
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1-7) (2009).

For the purpose of this regulation these terms are defined as follows: (a) The
term waters of the United States means (1) All waters which are currently used,
or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign
commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide; (2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands; (3) All other waters
such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams),
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could
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Section 3 of the CWRA states that jurisdiction will be returned to
those waters covered before the Rapanos and SWANCC opinions.107
However, the language of the Act would arguably permit jurisdiction to
extend beyond those earlier levels. Additionally, the CWRA retains the
numerous exemptions included in the original CWA.108 These include,
among others, exemptions for most “normal farming, silviculture, and
ranching activities, such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor
drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest
products, or upland soil and water conservation practices.”109 The
uncertainty in how far beyond pre-Rapanos levels CWRA jurisdiction
would extend has been one of the main concerns regarding the Act’s
passage.110
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND § 404 PERMITTING
A. The Commerce Clause
Pursuant to its commerce power,111 Congress may enact laws
regulating 1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; 2) “the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce”; and 3) “those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.”112 Many of the waters covered by the CWRA
constitute “channels of interstate commerce” or “things in interstate
commerce.”113 Federal control of these waters, all under federal
jurisdiction at least since 1972, is constitutional. The possible
Commerce Clause complications stem from CWRA authority over
waters not previously enumerated by Congress, such as “intrastate
lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa

affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters: (i) Which are
or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other
purposes; or (ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or (iii) Which are used or could be used for
industrial purpose by industries in interstate commerce; (4) All impoundments
of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this
section; (6) The territorial seas; (7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than
waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6)
of this section.
Id.
107. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(8).
108. Id. § 6.
109. Id. § 6(3).
110. See supra notes 22, 25–27 and accompanying text.
111. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that “The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”).
112. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
113. See id. at 558.
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lakes, [] natural ponds[,] . . . [and their] tributaries.”114 To survive
judicial scrutiny, a government defendant would need to demonstrate
that these intrastate waters “substantially affect interstate commerce.”115
The following paragraphs will demonstrate that most, if not all, of these
waters satisfy this criterion and are thus within Congress’ commerce
power.
The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on potential
Commerce Clause restraints to federal regulation of wetlands. In all
three of the Court’s § 404 opinions, the decision turned on the Corps’
statutory interpretation, not the statute’s constitutionality.116 For
example, in SWANCC, the petitioners asked the Court whether § 404
extended to an intrastate sand and gravel pit with “a scattering of
permanent and seasonal ponds,” and if so, “whether Congress could
exercise such authority consistent with the Commerce Clause.”117 The
Court found § 404 did not extend to such waters, and thereby avoided
the constitutional issue.118
Again in 2006, rather than making a judgment on Congress’
commerce powers, the Court invalidated a § 404 implementation
scheme on statutory interpretation grounds.119 Justice Kennedy signaled,
however, that the Commerce Clause is a potential factor in wetlands
regulation controversies.120 Justice Kennedy found that the CWA
granted federal jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact
waters and to wetlands having a “significant nexus” to nonnavigable
tributaries.121 He stated that “[t]his interpretation of the Act does not
raise federalism or Commerce Clause concerns sufficient to support a
presumption against its adoption.”122 He added that in “most cases
regulation of wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries and possess a
significant nexus with navigable waters will raise no serious
constitutional or federalism difficulty.”123 Justice Kennedy stated that
his “significant nexus” test should preclude unconstitutional extensions
of the CWA.124 This indicates that, regardless of whether Congress
amends the CWA with the CWRA, waters failing to have a “significant
nexus” to navigable waters or nonnavigable tributaries to navigable
114. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(8)(C), (E).
115. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
116. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738–39 (2006) (plurality opinion);
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 131 (1985).
117. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162–63.
118. Id. at 162.
119. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738–39 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 777, 782–83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 782. Navigable-in-fact waters are those waters that are actually navigable. This
phrase distinguishes these waters from the broad array of waters considered “navigable waters”
per the CWA, many of which are not actually navigable.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 783.
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waters will likely raise Commerce Clause issues for Justice Kennedy.
Given that Justice Kennedy often serves as a swing vote, this could
prove determinative should the CWRA be contested under the current
or a similar makeup of the Court.
Justice Kennedy’s presentiment is unfortunate. Though advocating a
case-by-case analysis of whether a wetland’s adjacency to nonnavigable
tributaries establishes a “significant nexus,”125 Justice Kennedy stated
“mere hydrologic connection should not suffice in all cases.”126 He
further noted that “the connection may be too insubstantial for the
hydrologic linkage to establish the required nexus with navigable waters
as traditionally understood.”127
However, waters that lack a “significant nexus” to navigable-in-fact
waters yet have hydrologic connections to navigable waters may
cumulatively affect interstate commerce. Justice Kennedy himself
stated, “‘[W]hen a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation
to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising
under that statute is of no consequence.’”128 Justice Kennedy drew this
from Gonzalez v. Raich,129 a 2005 Supreme Court decision reaffirming
the Wickard v. Filburn130 principal that proper Commerce Clause
jurisprudence looks to the impacts of activities in the aggregate.131
Accordingly, CWRA waters’ aggregate effect on interstate commerce
may open the door for Congress’ commerce power, despite the lack of a
“significant nexus” in specific instances. As Professor William Buzbee
125. Id. at 782.
126. Id. at 784. Hydrologic connectivity refers to the movement of water from one location
to another within the same hydrologic cycle. Catherine Pringle, What is Hydrologic Connectivity
and Why Is It Ecologically Important? http://cpringle.myweb.uga.edu/hydroconn.html (last
visited July 11, 2010). If such movement is possible between two bodies of water, the two
bodies would be hydrologically connected.
127. Id. at 784–85.
128. Id. at 783 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)).
129. 545 U.S. 1.
130. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
131. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the
Supreme Court stated, “While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that
activity is economic in nature.” Id. at 613. The commerce impacting functions of wetlands
arguably give wetlands an economic nature. See infra text accompanying notes 143–51. Should
wetlands be considered not “economic in nature,” however, Morrison might cut against
aggregating wetlands’ effects on interstate commerce. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. But the
fact that the Court chose not to “adopt a categorical rule” suggests aggregation has not been
definitively foreclosed. See id. Further, in a four-Justice dissent to Morrison, Justice Souter
noted that “Wickard applied an aggregate effects test to ostensibly domestic, noncommercial
farming,” and that an “attempt to distinguish between primary activities affecting commerce in
terms of the relatively commercial or noncommercial character of the primary conduct
proscribed comes with the pedigree of near tragedy . . . .” Id. at 641 (Souter, J., dissenting). The
issue, therefore, is not settled. A slight shift in the Court’s make-up could push the dissenting
position into the majority, thus making an aggregation of wetlands’ effects on interstate
commerce more clearly appropriate.
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attested during congressional hearings on the 2007 CWRA, due to the
“aggregate importance of often small types of waters and possibly
individually small environmental harms that in aggregate can be
substantial, the [CWRA] is on sound footing.”132
Wetlands play an essential role in watershed hydrology, which in the
aggregate affects interstate commerce. These waters reduce sediment
and toxic pollutant buildup in adjacent waters, serve as habitat for
aquatic animals, reduce downstream flooding,133 and contribute to
nutrient recycling.134 None of the commerce-impacting functions of
wetlands discriminate between waters with a “mere hydrologic
connection”135 to navigable waters and waters with a “significant
nexus” to such waters. Though the effect on interstate commerce may
be de minimis compared to the impact from wetlands adjacent to
navigable-in-fact waters or those bearing a “significant nexus” to
nonnavigable tributaries, the effect is still present, and in the aggregate,
may “substantially affect interstate commerce.”136
As discussed above, effects on commerce are not found exclusively
in waters with hydrologic connections to navigable waters; wholly
“intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams),
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, [] natural ponds[,] . . . [and their] tributaries”137 also
“substantially affect interstate commerce.”138 Like the CWA before it,
the CWRA would “establish[] a uniform baseline for the protection of
the nation’s waters, . . . ensur[ing] that all states and communities start
from a level playing field with respect to water quality standards.”139
Further, the CWRA, like its predecessor the CWA, would
attempt[] to avoid the potential for states with differing
water quality standards to be at competitive disadvantages
for encouraging economic growth, but rather [would]
facilitate[] states interested in establishing stricter water
quality standards to do so, without the fear that they will be
placed140at a competitive disadvantage to neighboring
states.
This “[f]ederal floor”141 would prevent a race to the bottom in wetlands
regulation and allow those states whose industries are affected by
132. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 225 (testimony of William W.
Buzbee, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law).
133. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 790.
135. Id. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
137. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(8)(C), (E).
138. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
139. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at viii.
140. Id.
141. Id. at vii.
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wetlands regulations to engage in interstate commerce from an initially
“level playing field.”142
Anticipating contentions from the detractors of federal regulation of
wetlands, the CWRA drafters included numerous connections to
interstate commerce.143 For example, the CWRA references the effects
on interstate commerce caused by pollution.144 Wetlands are a valuable
source of water filtration and purification.145 This pollution mitigation is
thwarted when wetlands are drained or filled. Without § 404 permitting
for CWRA waters, the draining or filling of wholly intrastate wetlands
likely occurs without consideration of such factors. This affects
interstate commerce. The CWRA also notes the exacerbation of flood
damage caused by the draining or filling of wetlands, and the
consequent effects on interstate commerce.146 Concerning downstream
flooding, Justice Stevens noted in his Rapanos dissent that, “‘There is
no constitutional reason why Congress cannot, under the commerce
power, treat the watersheds as a key to flood control on navigable
streams and their tributaries.’”147 Further, wetlands and streams play a
part in filtering drinking water supplies.148 With ever increasing demand
for this commodity,149 the effects on interstate commerce will become
increasingly pronounced. In addition to these pervasive effects on
interstate commerce, the CWRA notes the importance of wetlands and
other intrastate waters with respect to “waterfowl hunting, bird
watching, fishing, and photography”150 and the correlated impacts on
“the travel, tourism, recreation, and sporting sectors of the economy of

142. Id. at viii; see also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 n.7 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (holding that “[a]pplication of the [Endangered Species Act] to habitat degradation has a
further impact on interstate commerce by removing the incentives for states ‘to adopt lower
standards of endangered species protection in order to attract development,’ thereby preventing
a destructive ‘race to the bottom’”). In addition, see Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981), which justified federal surface mining and
reclamation standards by noting that “[t]he prevention of . . . destructive interstate competition
is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause.” Though Hodel was
treated unfavorably by the Lopez Court, 514 U.S. at 557–59, the federal floor to prevent
destructive interstate competition rationale was not overruled. This rationale, then, could be
used to demonstrate a rational basis for Congress using its commerce power to enact the
CWRA.
143. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(19)–(25).
144. Id. § 3(19).
145. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2) (2009).
146. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(21)(B).
147. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 803–04 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525 (1941)).
148. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(22)–(23).
149. As population growth, pollution, and increased consumption will likely create greater
demand for water, “One of the defining issues of the twenty-first century will be the allocation
of fresh water supplies.” Christine A. Klein, Mary Jane Angelo & Richard Hamann,
Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REV. 403, 404 (2009).
150. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(24)(A).
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the United States.”151 The fact that there are non-economic reasons for
Congress to expand its CWA jurisdiction is not fatal to the CWRA.152
Inclusive in “the national objective of restoring and maintaining the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”153
are commerce-affecting factors, and these factors put the CWRA within
Congress’ commerce powers.
To contravene arguments that the aforementioned effects on
interstate commerce are too attenuated or insubstantial, paragraph
twenty-five of the CWRA illustrates an undeniable effect on interstate
commerce.154 It states, “[A]ctivities that result in the discharge of
pollutants into waters of the United States are commercial or economic
in nature, and, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.”155 The CWRA is an amendment to a water quality statute,
but the § 404 permitting over those waters is a regulatory section of the
statute156 and thus inextricably linked to commerce. A fair reading of
the CWRA demonstrates Congress’ unambiguous intent to regulate both
commerce-impacting waters and waters affected by “activities that
result in the discharge of pollutants” into waters.157 Both the waters and
the activities affecting those waters have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and therefore are within Congress’ commerce
powers.
The CWRA amended CWA may be compared to the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) and its § 9 “take” permits.158 Each Act taken as a
whole regulates a natural resource, while the provisions on permitting
requirements (§ 404 and § 9, respectively) regulate what is typically
commercial activity.159 In Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton,160 the
petitioner real estate development company contended that application
of the ESA contravened the Commerce Clause.161 In finding to the
contrary, the D.C. Circuit noted that “the rationale upon which [to] rely
focuses on the activity that the federal government seeks to regulate,”162
as opposed to the object of the regulation. The court explained that
[the] regulated activity is Rancho Viejo’s planned
commercial development, not the arroyo toad that it
151. Id. § 3(24)(B).
152. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964)
(“Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce
with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong.”).
153. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(3).
154. Id. § 3(25).
155. Id.
156. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
157. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(25).
158. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006).
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006); 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006).
160. 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
161. Id. at 1064.
162. Id. at 1069.
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threatens. The ESA does not purport to tell toads what they
may or may not do. Rather, section 9 limits the taking of
listed species, and its prohibitions and corresponding
penalties apply to the persons who do the taking, not to the
species that are taken.163
A similar rationale in a CWRA amended § 404 context would focus on
the effects on interstate commerce of the “activities that result in the
discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States”164 rather than
solely the effects caused by the waters themselves.
It should be noted that in SWANCC, the Supreme Court seemed
uncomfortable basing CWA jurisdiction on the commerce impacts of
the regulated activity rather than solely on the commerce impacts of the
waters.165 Concerning the Corps basis of jurisdiction on the commercial
impacts associated with viewing migratory birds, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist stated:
These arguments raise significant constitutional questions.
For example, we would have to evaluate the precise object
or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce. This is not clear, for although the
Corps has claimed jurisdiction over petitioner’s land
because it contains water areas used as habitat by migratory
birds, respondents now, post litem motam, focus upon the
fact that the regulated activity is petitioner’s municipal
landfill, which is “plainly of a commercial nature.” But this
is a far cry, indeed, from the “navigable waters” and
“waters of the United States” to which the statute by its
terms extends.166
This dictum was supported by Justice Kennedy, the crucial vote
should the current Court address Commerce Clause implications of the
CWRA.167 However, the Court has not always focused its Commerce
Clause analysis solely on the thing to be protected.168 During
congressional hearings on the 2007 CWRA, Professor Buzbee pointed
out that “in the Supreme Court’s major Commerce Clause decisions in
163. Id. at 1072. It is interesting to note that in 2003 while sitting on the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, Chief Justice John Roberts dissented in an order denying the Rancho Viejo
petitioner a rehearing en banc. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir.
2003). Roberts noted that Rancho Viejo seemed inconsistent with Lopez. Id. However, in any
future Supreme Court decision on the Commerce Clause and environmental regulation, Chief
Justice Roberts is not likely to be the pivotal vote.
164. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(25).
165. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).
166. Id.
167. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s SWANCC opinion garnered the support of Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Clarence Thomas. Id. at 161.
168. See infra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
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recent years, it has focused at times on the thing to be protected, while
at other times focused on the nature of the activity that would, if not
regulated, cause harm.”169 Buzbee noted that while the Court in Lopez
focused on the commercial impacts of the thing to be protected (gun
possession),170 “[i]n the later United States v. Morrison case, 529 U.S.
598 (2000), the Court focused on the lack of a commercial aspect to
violence against women.”171
Perhaps in light of the disputes this distinction has caused, the
CWRA drafters made sure that the Act would explicitly establish
jurisdiction both over waters that have commercial impacts and waters
affected by commercial activities.172 The Act states that the covered
“‘waters of the United States’ means all waters subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide, the territorial seas, and all interstate and intrastate
waters . . . to the fullest extent that these waters, or activities affecting
these waters, are subject to the legislative power of Congress under the
Constitution.”173 Therefore, if an activity impacting interstate commerce
affects CWRA waters, CWRA jurisdiction kicks in.174 No contention of
an agency construing statutory directive post litem motam could be
made. Additionally, the Act states that included in “‘waters of the
United States’ [are] those features that were treated as such pursuant to
the regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Corps
of Engineers in existence before the dates of [SWANCC and
Rapanos].”175 This, of course, includes waters “the use, degradation, or
destruction of which could affect interstate . . . commerce . . . .”176
Therefore, whether the focus of Commerce Clause inquiry is on the
particular waters added to federal protection under the CWRA or on the
regulated activities that potentially degrade those waters, substantial
effects on interstate commerce are present. As noted in Morrison, “in
every case where we have sustained federal regulation under [Wickard’s
169. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 225 (testimony of William W.
Buzbee, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law).
170. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
171. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 225 (testimony of William W.
Buzbee, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law).
172. CWRA, supra note 8, § 4(25).
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. In addition to this explicit indication of the extent of CWRA jurisdiction, the entire
Act is peppered with references to the “activities affecting these waters.” Id.; see also id. § 3(25)
(“[A]ctivities that result in the discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States are
commercial or economic in nature, and, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.”); id. § 3(28) (“[R]egulating activities affecting the waters of the United States is a
necessary and proper means of implementing treaties . . . .”); id. § 3(32) (“[R]egulating activities
affecting the waters of the United States is a necessary and proper means of protecting Federal
land, including hundreds of millions of acres of parkland . . . .”); id. § 3(33) (“[R]egulating
activities affecting the waters of the United States is necessary to protect Federal land and
waters from discharges of pollutants and other forms of degradation.”).
175. Id. § 3(8).
176. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2009).
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aggregation principle], the regulated activity was of an apparent
commercial character.”177 This lends support to the view that the
“activities that result in the discharge of pollutants into waters”178 could
legitimately be the focus of Commerce Clause analysis. If the focus
should be solely the waters, however, the aforementioned connections
to interstate commerce substantiate the rational basis for an exercise of
Congress’ commerce powers.179
An honest Court would give the CWRA the “‘presumption of
constitutionality’” owed congressional legislation.180 The Act is crafted
to “reach[] both activities that are economic or commercial causing
harms to specified sorts of waters, and also protect[] waters that are
themselves of economic or commercial significance individually or in
the aggregate.”181 Indeed, “[t]hese are sound, core sorts of justifications
for federal constitutional power.”182 Though the CWRA may extend to
the limits of Congress’ commerce powers, Congress has every right to
craft such legislation. They have done so with the CWRA, issuing both
a “‘clear and manifest’ statement”183 of federal jurisdiction, and
referencing the commerce-impacting factors that legitimize it.184
B. State Sovereignty and the Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009
Despite the substantial effects that wetlands and wetlands regulation
have on interstate commerce, critics will undoubtedly argue that the
CWRA would “result in a significant impingement of the States’

177. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 n.4 (2000) (emphasis added and internal
citation omitted).
178. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(25).
179. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964) (“[W]here we find that the
legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an
end.”). Further, in evaluating the effects on interstate commerce, a broad interpretation of
economic activity should be used. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 491 (4th Cir. 2000). In
Gibbs, the court noted that:
Although the connection to economic or commercial activity plays a central
role in whether a regulation will be upheld under the Commerce Clause,
economic activity must be understood in broad terms. Indeed, a cramped view
of commerce would cripple a foremost federal power and in so doing would
eviscerate national authority.
Id.
180. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607).
181. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 224 (testimony of William W.
Buzbee, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law).
182. Id.
183. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion) (quoting
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994)).
184. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(19)–(25).
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traditional and primary power over land and water use.”185 In striking
down the wetland permitting scheme applied to the Rapanos petitioners,
Justice Scalia noted that “[r]egulation of land use, as through the
issuance of the development permits sought by petitioners . . . , is a
quintessential state and local power.”186 The fact that thirty-three states
and the District of Columbia favored the Corps’ interpretation of federal
jurisdiction did not influence Justice Scalia.187 Rather, he stated that it
“makes no difference . . . that some States wish to unburden
themselves” of their “responsibilities and rights” concerning wetlands
regulation.188
Justice Scalia’s opinion, however, does not consider the effects that
one state’s waters will have on another state’s waters. These effects are
more pronounced for, though not limited to, waters within the same
hydrologic cycle as waters in a bordering state. As noted in Part IV.A.,
all of these waters are not included in Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” test.189 Without federal water standards, states may exercise their
own power over land and water use yet are powerless to prevent water
degradation caused by bordering states with laxer standards. One might
point out that this argument could be used concerning any land and
water regulation. States are at least indirectly affected by many
regulations of neighboring states. However, water is different from
other traditionally state-regulated issues because water is in constant
motion. Land, for the most part, is not. Recognition of hydrologic cycles
played a part in the drafting of both the CWA and the CWRA190 and it
plays a part in understanding the drawback of relying on a “patchwork
of state water pollution control efforts.”191
Recognizing the interconnectedness of waters, along with the
consequent effects on interstate commerce, helps undermine the
argument that the CWRA would “result in a significant
impingement”192 of what should appropriately be state sovereignty. Less
persuasive, however, is the justification that without federal regulation
the states’ hands are tied. During hearings for the 2007 CWRA, the
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Water Resources and
Environment Majority Staff listed six concerns caused by the SWANCC
and Rapanos decisions.193 The fourth concern raised this argument.194
185. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001). However, “[t]he purported federal deference
to state water law is not nearly as strong as one might think. The Supreme Court has not
hesitated to find state law preempted when it interferes with federal navigational powers, flood
control, hydropower, or vessel safety.” Zellmer, supra note 51, at 617.
186. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738 (plurality opinion) (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson
Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767–68 n.30 (1982)).
187. Id. at 737 n.8.
188. Id. (Internal quote marks and external citation omitted).
189. Supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
190. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at vii.
191. Id.
192. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
193. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at x. The six concerns raised were:
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The Subcommittee noted that without federal jurisdiction and “in the
absence of affirmative State legislative or administrative action to cover
these waters,” the waters would not be covered.195 Though true, this is
not sound justification for federal jurisdiction. If the states want waters
regulated that are not covered by federal regulations, the states can
implement legislative or administrative action to regulate those waters.
This might be costly and burdensome, but it is not impossible.
However, the Subcommittee continued by stating that
[a]ccording to the Corps, “approximately [twenty-five]
States have some limitations on their ability to establish
environmental requirements that are more stringent than
those called for under federal law. This ranges from
notification requirements when programs proposed are
more stringent, to strict prohibitions against state programs
that are more stringent than the [Clean Water Act].” These
so-called “no more stringent” rules limit the ability of
certain states to assume responsibility for the protection of
waterbodies and wetlands that were once covered under the
Clean Water Act, and turn “federal floors into regulatory
ceilings” for the protection of water quality.196
However, the prohibition created by “no more stringent” rules is, at
least in part, illusory. A state wishing to implement regulations covering
waters not covered by the CWA would need to enact a bill with the
support of, in most circumstances, 51% of its legislators. An extra
hurdle would exist for a state with a “no more stringent” rule. In those
cases, the legislature would need to either repeal or make an exception
to the rule. Such action would likely require 51% of the legislators.

(1) Inconsistent Judicial Tests for Determining Jurisdiction; (2) Uncertainty and
Delay in State and Local Construction Projects; (3) Impact on the Control of
Point Sources of Pollution; (4) Obstacles for States to Address the
SWANCC/Rapanos Coverage Gap; (5) Potential for States to Lose State Clean
Water Act Funding; and (6) Implications of SWANCC/Rapanos on other
Environmental Authorities.
Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at xiv.
196. Id. at xiv (quoting U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR
RAPANOS AND CARABELL DECISION 20 (2007), http://www.usace.army.mil/CECW/Documents/cec
wo/reg/cwa_guide/rapanos_qa_06-05-07.pdf (last visited May 17, 2010); Andrew Hecht, Note,
Obstacles to the Devolution of Environmental Protection: States’ Self-Imposed Limitations on
Rulemaking, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 105, 113 (2004)). The source relied upon by the
Subcommittee actually denotes twenty-seven states with “no more stringent” rules. Hecht,
supra, at 116. Seventeen of the twenty-seven states have generally applicable “no more
stringent” rules that apply to all water quality statutes. Id. Ten of the states have rules that apply
to only certain areas of water quality regulation. Id.
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Therefore, if a state has the political will to expand its regulatory
scheme, it should have the political will to first disable a “no more
stringent” rule. Of the twenty-seven states with “no more stringent”
rules governing water quality, two such rules are executive orders, one
is a binding policy statement, and the rest are statutes.197 None are
mandated by state constitutional provisions. Accordingly, whereas
political or budgetary factors may prevent a state from regulating waters
not covered by federal regulations, no state is actually barred from
increasing the scope of regulation. The Subcommittee’s reference to “no
more stringent” rules in the congressional hearings for the 2007 CWRA
could lead one to draw inaccurate conclusions.198 A more persuasive
and honest argument focuses on the effects of a state’s degraded waters
on neighboring states, as discussed above.
V. THE UNCERTAIN ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE CLEAN WATER
RESTORATION ACT OF 2009
Though the CWRA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’
commerce powers, in its present form, it lacks the clarity a prudent
Congress would require. Insufficient time and resources have been
spent on researching the economic impacts the Act would have on local
governments and the private sector. The hundreds of pages of testimony
reveal concern but do little to fill the gaps.199 Without numbers
demonstrating what the costs will be, members of the regulated
community are understandably worried.200
As of the time of this Note’s publication, studies have not predicted
how many additional applicants will come under Corps and EPA
permitting jurisdiction should the scope of CWA waters be expanded. A
2002 article from the Natural Resources Journal provided statistics on
how much the permitting process costs individual applicants.201 Both
the Rapanos Court in 2006 and testimony during CWRA hearings in
2009 relied on this article for data on economic impacts,202 suggesting it
is one of the few authoritative texts on the subject. However, the article
provided no insight on how many additional applicants would be added
197. Hecht, supra note 196, at 116. Wisconsin’s rule is a binding policy statement.
Maryland and Pennsylvania have executive orders. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming have statutes. Id. at 116 nn.42, 45–46.
198. See CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at xiii–xv.
199. See sources cited supra notes 22 and 26–27.
200. Id.
201. Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 6, at 74–75.
202. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“The
average applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the
process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915—not
counting costs of mitigation or design changes.”); Meeting the Needs of Small Businesses and
Family Farmers in Regulating Our Nation’s Waters, H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong.
6 (2009) (statement of Trey Pebley, Vice President, McAllen Construction, Inc.).
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under different statutory regimes—crucial information for honest debate
on wetlands jurisdiction.
Concerning the pending legislation on the CWRA, a 2009
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Cost Estimate noted that
cost[s] . . . would be the additional costs of obtaining
permits (or designing projects to avoid having to obtain a
permit), net of any savings that would result from a
modified permitting process. Information about the
additional bodies of water that would be covered by the bill
is scarce, and the number of activities that would require a
permit is uncertain. Therefore, CBO has no basis for
estimating . . . the cost of the [CWRA].203
The CBO Cost Estimate also stated that decreased litigation would
save the federal government an “insignificant” sum and that government
permit receipts would likely increase by less than $100,000 per year.204
In discussing the number of likely applicants, the report noted that the
number of Corps-issued standard permits decreased 30% in the years
following SWANCC and Rapanos.205 However, “information from the
Corps indicates that the decline is mainly attributable to weakening
economic conditions.”206 The two-page report offered little additional
information and no concrete numbers on the probable economic impact
that passage of the CWRA would have on the regulated community.207
The CBO staff contact for impacts on the private sector confirmed this
scarcity of data.208
Since 1999, the CBO has prepared reports on at least eighteen other
bills amending or otherwise relating to the CWA.209 Of those eighteen,
203. CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 11, at 2.
204. Id. at 1–2.
205. Id. at 2.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1–2.
208. Telephone Interview with Amy Petz, Analyst, Congressional Budget Office (Sept. 21,
2009).
209. Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 2080, Sewage Overflow Community
Right-to-Know Act, at 1 (2008); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 2452, A Bill
to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Ensure That Sewage Treatment Plants
Monitor for and Report Discharges of Sewage, and for Other Purposes, at 1 (2008);
Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 3630, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize a Program Relating to the Lake Pontchartrain Basin, and
for Other Purposes, at 1 (2006); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 3963, A Bill
to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Extend the Authorization of
Appropriations for Long Island Sound, at 1 (2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost
Estimate: H.R. 1721, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize
Programs to Improve the Quality of Coastal Recreation Waters, and for Other Purposes, at 1
(2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 158, Long Island Sound Stewardship
Act of 2005, at 1 (2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 1359, A Bill to
Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Extend the Pilot Program for Alternative
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none is as ambiguous about costs as the CWRA Cost Estimate.210
Addressing the CWRA, the CBO noted that there is “no basis for
estimating whether the cost [of passage of the CWRA] would exceed
the annual thresholds established in [the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act] for intergovernmental or private-sector mandates.”211 Of the other
eighteen cost estimates, all eighteen had estimates for the economic
impacts on the federal government and the private sector.212 Only two
of the eighteen did not have estimates for the costs to be imposed on
intergovernmental agencies.213 However, both of these did have an
estimate of the number of intergovernmental entities to be impacted,214
information missing from the CBO Cost Estimate for the CWRA.215
This evidences that proposing an amendment to the CWA with such
scant information on costs is an aberration from congressional norms on
modern CWA amendments.216
Water Source Projects, at 1 (2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 624, A
Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Authorize Appropriations for Sewer
Overflow Control Grants, at 1 (2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 4731,
A Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize the National Estuary
Program, at 1 (2004); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 4688, A Bill to Amend
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize the Chesapeake Bay Program, at 1
(2004); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 4470, A Bill to Amend the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act to Extend the Authorization of Appropriations for the Lake
Pontchartrain Basin Restoration Program from Fiscal Year 2005 to 2010, at 1 (2004);
Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 784, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act to Authorize Appropriations for Sewer Overflow Control Grants, at 1
(2004); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 1961, Water Investment Act of 2002, at
1 (2002); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 522, Beaches Environmental
Assessment and Coastal Health Act of 2000, at 1 (2000); Congressional Budget Office, Cost
Estimate: H.R. 1237, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Permit Grants
for the National Estuary Program to be Used for the Development and Implementation of a
Comprehensive Conservation and Management Plan, to Reauthorize Appropriations to Carry
out the Program, and for Other Purposes, at 1 (2000); Congressional Budget Office, Cost
Estimate: H.R. 2328, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize
the Clean Lakes Program, at 1 (2000); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: A Bill to
Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Provide that Certain Environmental Reports
Shall Continue to be Required to be Submitted, at 1 (1999) (no Senate number provided);
Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 999, Beaches Environmental Assessment,
Cleanup, and Health Act of 1999, at 1 (1999).
210. Compare sources cited supra note 209, with CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note
11.
211. CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 11, at 2. For 2009, these thresholds are $69
million and $139 million, respectively. Id.
212. See supra note 209.
213. Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 2080, Sewage Overflow Community
Right-to-Know Act, at 2 (2008); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 2452, A Bill
to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Ensure That Sewage Treatment Plants
Monitor for and Report Discharges of Sewage, and for Other Purposes, at 2 (2008).
214. See sources cited supra note 213.
215. See CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 11.
216. See supra note 209. The eighteen CBO reports listed in footnote 209 were for far
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Congressional passage of the CWRA without ascertaining a more
exact cost estimate, or at least some cost estimate, would be
irresponsible. In his Rapanos dissent, Justice Stevens seemed
untroubled by the plight of the regulated community.217 He commented
that, “The fact that large investments are required to finance large
developments merely means that those who are most adversely affected
by the Corps’ permitting decisions are persons who have the ability to
communicate effectively with their representatives.”218 Those
individuals are communicating with their representatives, and the
opinions thus far have been negative.219 However, it is difficult to say
with certainty that the financiers of large developments are truly the
people who would be most adversely affected. Home developers
required to acquire § 404 permits are presumably passing costs on to
consumers.220 In addition to the actual costs of permitting, developers
incur various costs from delay.221 Developers waiting for permits must
carry capital, which increases interest expenses for monies borrowed.222
The developers must also bear labor expenses for additional time,
further adding to total costs.223 Some of these costs are likely included
in the costs finally paid by the consumers. Considering these factors,
Justice Stevens’ opinion that those bearing the costs have adequate
representation might not be entirely accurate.224 This, coupled with the
uncertainty of what the overall costs would be, makes passage of the
CWRA unwise.
VI. CONCLUSION
Should Congress enact the CWRA and remove the word “navigable”
from the definition of waters reached by the CWA,225 it would be acting
simpler (and less ambitious) congressional proposals with more easily ascertainable cost
estimates. The last CWA amendment to approach the scale of the CWRA was the Water Quality
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). However, the CBO
began producing cost estimates for impacts on the private sector only after passage of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–71 (2006). See Congressional
Budget Office, CBO’s Role in the Budget Process, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/budgetprocess.
shtml (last visited May 18, 2010). Consequently, there are no CBO cost estimates for major
amendments to the CWA to compare with the CWRA Cost Estimate.
217. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 799 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. Id.
219. See sources cited supra notes 22 and 26–27.
220. See Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 6, at 81 (“A National Association of Home
Builders survey reveals that all aspects of the Section 404 permitting process taken together add
$400 to the price of an average new home. Viewed another way, the survey concludes that costs
imposed by Section 404 requirements are 0.16 percent of total homebuilding costs and 0.4
percent of total development costs.”).
221. Id. at 81–82.
222. Id. at 82.
223. Id.
224. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 799 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. See CWRA, supra note 8, § 4(1).
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within the commerce powers granted in Article I, § 8, of the
Constitution.226 Many CWRA waters are “channels of interstate
commerce” or “things in interstate commerce.”227 Other CWRA waters,
in particular the “intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, [] natural ponds[,] . . . [and] tributaries”228 not
covered by the 1972 CWA, “substantially affect interstate
commerce.”229 The CWRA exerts federal jurisdiction beyond waters
with direct effects on commerce and includes even those waters where
“activities affecting [the] waters[] are subject to the legislative power of
Congress.”230 Though this admittedly “invokes the outer limits of
Congress’ power,” it is within that limit, and the Act is a “clear
indication that Congress intended that result.”231
Despite the Act’s sound constitutional footing, however, Congress’
failure to discern the probable economic impacts suggests that more
work should be done before enacting the CWRA or similar legislation.
Further, it is uncertain where costs will rest, whether developers will
absorb the costs or merely be a conduit to pass costs on to less well
represented and less financially insulated citizens.232 To obtain the 92nd
Congress’ goal to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,”233 some sort of legislative
amendment to § 404 jurisdiction is likely appropriate. It would be
irresponsible, however, for Congress to pass the Act in its present form.
To expect citizens to support legislation with unknown repercussive
costs is an unrealistic and imprudent endeavor.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
See CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(8)(C), (E).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559; supra Part IV.A.
See CWRA, supra note 8, § 4(25).
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001).
See supra Part V.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss4/8

28

